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Abstract 
 
"Fixed fortifications are monuments to the 
stupidity of man" 
 
General George Patton, Jr. 
 
 
Solutions to the Byzantine General Problem are 
applied to the design of an Intrusion Detection 
& Countermeasure Systems, called SAFE, 
being developed at the Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute System Security Research Laboratory 
(WSSRL). As described in this paper, 
Byzantine Agreement Protocols (BAP) arrived 
at a consensus on (identify) which nodes have 
been compromised, through the use of a series 
of synchronized, secure rounds of message 
exchanges. Having arrived at such consensus, 
offending or compromised nodes are isolated 
and countermeasure actions initiated by the 
system. Specifically, we consider in this 
manuscript the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of Byzantine 
Agreement Protocols to the intrusion detection 
problem.  In addition, the set of necessary 
assumptions needed for the BAP protocol to 
operate correctly, such as the need for a 
secure communication channel, are presented 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an exponential 
increase, as reported by CERT, see Figure 1, 
in security threats or attacks by both 
individuals attempting to use a system without 
authorization (i.e., crackers) and those who 
have legitimate access to the system but are 
abusing their privileges (i.e., the insider threat). 
The nature and cost of these threats has 
contributed to the increased focus, research, 
and development in both academia and 
industry in the design and implementation of 
systems that are resistant to hackers 
/crackers attack.  More specifically, dating 
back to the early nineties the study, research 
and development, and the implementation of 
Intrusion Detection & Countermeasure Systems 
(IDCS), has become an essential element of 
the design of modern computer systems and 
applications, see [1], [2], [3], [4].  
 
Unfortunately, current Research in the area of 
Systems Security in general, and in the 
design and implementation of Intrusion 
Detection & Countermeasure Systems in 
particular, has shown to have some significant 
limitations.  For a complete assessment of the 
current state of the art of such systems, see 
Allen [2], Jansen [4].  Modern approaches to 
deal with such limitations have resulted in the 
design of distributed systems (a.k.a, network 
based systems), Spafford [1], 
Balasubramaniyan [5], where autonomous local 
agents collect and analyze information but 
cooperate with other agents in the system to 
arrive at decisions on the potential set of 
intrusions.  All such systems suffer from several 
limitations as describe in [4].  Amongst the 
most important limitation of current approaches 
is the inherent vulnerability of the agents to 
attack, rendering the system designed to 
protect “the System” inoperable. 
 
In recent months, at Worcester Polytechnic 
System Security Research Laboratory 
(WSSRL), research into the design of an 
Intrusion Detection and Countermeasure 
System, name SAFE, that can effectively 
addressed this limitation, has taken shape.  
The key to such a system is a distributed 
module called the distributed Trust Manager or 
TTM.  The TTM is an independent entity 
serving three major system functions. These 
are: 
 
! It knows which logical nodes in the 
system can be trusted  this is 
accomplished through a trust 
relationship matrix; 
! It uses a Byzantine Agreement 
Protocol to identify and isolate nodes 
that have been compromised; 
! It relays a Last Gasp Message to 
other nodes in the system; and 
! Prevents the trust system from being 
partition (Quorum formation). 
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Figure 1  Growth in Number of Incidents Handle by 
CERT/CC 
 
In SAFE, the primary security mechanism used 
(at a system level1) is the creation, updating, 
and maintenance of a trust relationship matrix.  
This matrix, which is manage by the Trust 
Manager, contains up to date information on 
the trust relationship betweens all the nodes in 
the system.  In SAFE both weak and strong 
trusted relationships exist among the nodes.  
The concept of a weak/ strong relationship, as 
used here, refers to the level of access that one 
node, say node na has established with another 
node, lets say node nb.  
 
A weak relationship will be, for example, the 
situation where users in one system can ftp to 
users in another system only. At the same time, 
a strong relationship will refer to a 
relationship where a node has complete access 
to all the privileged functions of the other node. 
Trust relationships are not symmetrical.  In 
                                                 
1 SAFE implements different layers of security 
protection and containment at different levels in 
the system.  For example, at the local layer an 
autonomous agent, called SHM, is responsible 
for detecting Intrusions locally.  However, 
information on the state of the system is share 
with other nodes through the use of TTM 
protocols. 
Figure 2, shown below, nodes a and node e 
have the same level of trust with each other, 
while node a is trusted by node b (node a can 
access privileged functions in node b) and not 
vice-versa. The arrow in the diagram shows the 
direction of trust. 
 
A trust function  Tij (t) for i ≠ j, exist between two 
nodes, and as mentioned earlier, it is not 
necessarily symmetrical.  Tij is a function of 
time. In addition, the lack of trust between two 
nodes will be denoted as having a trust 
relationship of zero value, Tij (t) = 0. In this 
example, Node a is the source of the intruder 
attack, while Node h is the target of the attack. 
However, because there is not a direct trust 
relationship between Node a and Node h, the 
intruder is force to a set of attempted intrusions 
into nodes e and f, before attempting to 
compromised h.  Due to the topology of the 
trust relationships (in Figure 2, the topological 
description is a logical one and not physical) 
between nodes, compromising any node other 
than nodes b or f will not allow the intruder to 
compromise the target node h. This topological 
constraint amongst nodes in a network has a 
significant advantage over other approaches.  
That is, it allows the designer of the IDCS 
System to create multiple logical layers of 
defense against intruders, in effect, creating 
time to detect potential intrusions and dwarfed 
them.  Further, the concept of a trust 
relationship can be extended to include trust 
relationships with nodes that do not belong to 
the immediate system under protection.  For 
example, a system like SAFE could pro-actively 
engage other nodes outside the local network 
to determine how trustworthy they are, and 
then, create a periphery trust matrix to manage 
the interactions with such nodes. 
 
An example, of using a topological constraint to 
manage and impede intrusions will be as 
follows.  Lets say that nodes b and e suspect 
an intrusion by using traditional audit methods.  
Then, nodes b and e can invoke a state change 
on their trust relationships with other nodes in 
such a way that,  
 
Equation 1: 
 
Taj (t) = 0  for all j ≠ a and t > t of intrusion; and 
 
 
Tej  (t) = 0  for all j ≠ e and t > t of intrusion. 
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Figure 2: A Simplified Intrusion Detection Model 
 
 
 
 
Once, the problem of intrusion detection is 
formulated in this context, then well know 
solutions to the Byzantine Generals Problem 
are readily available.  In the remaining of this 
paper, we will present how one such solution, a 
Byzantine Agreement Protocol (BAP), can be 
used in the design of the Trust Manager (TTM). 
 
 
1.1 The Byzantine Generals Problem 
 
The Byzantine Agreement Protocol (BAP), 
which aims at establishing a fault-tolerant 
agreement when one or more of the nodes in a 
system have been compromised or failed, 
received considerably attention in the literature 
during the late 80 and early 90s. The primary 
application then was the design Fault Tolerant 
Systems.  Recently, and mainly because of the 
increased importance of the security problem, 
interest on its usage has increased. Lamport, et 
al. described the Byzantine General Problem in 
[7, 8].  Specifically, the Byzantine General 
problem formulation is as follows.    
 
Imagine that several divisions of a Byzantine 
army are camped outside an enemy city, each 
division commanded by its own general. The 
generals can communicate with one another 
only by messenger. After observing the enemy, 
they must decide upon a common plan of 
action. However, some of the generals may be 
traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals 
from reaching agreement. The generals must 
have an algorithm to guarantee that: 
 
A. All loyal generals decide upon the same 
plan of action. The loyal generals will all do 
what the algorithm says they should, but 
the traitors may do anything they wish. The 
algorithm must guarantee condition A 
regardless of what the traitors do. The loyal 
generals should not only reach agreement, 
but should agree upon a reasonable plan. 
 
We therefore also want to insure that 
 
B. A small number of traitors cannot cause the 
loyal generals to adopt a bad plan. 
 
Further, in [7], the Byzantine Generals 
Problem was described as the design of an 
algorithm such that when the commanding 
general sends an order to his (n  1) lieutenant 
generals, then the algorithm guarantees that 
 
IC1.  ALL LOYAL LIEUTENANTS OBEY 
THE SAME ORDER. 
 
IC2.  IF THE COMMANDING GENERAL IS 
LOYAL, THEN EVERY LOYAL 
LIEUTENANT OBEYS THE ORDER 
HE SENDS. 
 
The BAP algorithm is essentially a distributed 
algorithm designed to achieve consensus. 
Borrowing from Lampson [9], several 
processes achieve consensus if they all agree 
on some allowed value called the outcome (if 
they could agree on any value the solution 
would be trivial: always agree on 0). Thus the 
interface to consensus has two actions: allow a 
value, and read the outcome. A consensus 
algorithm terminates when all non-faulty (un-
compromised) processes know the outcome. 
 
BAP as a consensus algorithm can be applied 
to two critical problems, which are of great 
importance in the design of secure systems.  
These are: 
 
Membership, where a group of processes 
cooperating to provide a highly available 
service need to agree on which processes are 
currently functioning as members of the group. 
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Every time a process fails (is compromised) or 
starts working2 again a new consensus must be 
generated. 
 
Electing a leader amongst a group of 
processes prior to an exact determination on 
the number of processes that belong to the 
group. 
 
Within this context, if we substitute Generals 
for nodes in distributed systems, and 
consensus for the need to agree on which 
processes (agents, modules, etc.) are 
safe/sane (i.e., have not been compromised).  
Then, the problem of identifying an isolating 
compromised nodes can be easily described as 
follows: 
 
Imagine in SAFE several nodes, which 
cooperate with each other to detect intrusions.  
Each node runs an autonomous agent, the 
TTM, which continuously sends messages to 
other nodes.  The message that is sends has 
two possible values. These are: 
 
Message A1: “keep sane” or “0”; and 
 
Message A2: “I am potentially compromised” 
or “1”. Enclosed is the signature that implies a 
potential intrusion”. 
 
In this context, the nodes that can be trusted 
should be able to determine which nodes are 
compromised, if theres any, and arrive at a 
consensus.  A small number of nodes that have 
been compromised should not be able cause 
the other nodes to adopt a wrong or even 
malevolent message. The Byzantine 
Agreement Protocol (BAP), by which we can 
detect intrusion and minimize the success of 
attacks, fits this context perfectly. 
 
Note that BAP doesnt always hold. There is a 
threshold t.  That is, if more than t nodes are 
compromised, the BAP will also fail. The 
resiliency of the algorithms to the number of 
nodes compromised depends heavily on the 
                                                 
2 In SAFE, a process (node) starts working 
again after the local control module SHM has: 
(1) isolated the process from the network; (2) 
launch the prescribed set of countermeasures; 
and (3) certified that the node is sane again.  
When such actions are completed, SHM makes 
a request to the local Trust Manager module to 
re-integrate. 
communication mechanism used to exchange 
messages, and its characterize by the value of 
t. Lamport et al. [7], suggested two distinct 
algorithms depending on the mechanism used 
for communication. The first one, which he 
called an “Oral Message Algorithm”, makes use 
of unauthenticated sequence of oral message 
exchanges.  The second algorithm, known as 
“Signed Message Algorithm, depends on the 
assumption that messages are signed, and that 
the identity of the sender can be guaranteed. In 
the case of the Oral Message Algorithm it can 
be shown that consensus can be achieved 
when there are at most  3/)1( −m  nodes 
that have been compromised among a total 
number of m nodes.  Similarly, he 
demonstrates that the Signed Message 
Algorithm can effectively achieve consensus if 
at most m-2 nodes have been compromised 
amongst a total of m nodes. 
 
In order to improve the intrusion-resiliency of 
SAFE, as well as to make the implementation 
of the Byzantine Agreement protocol simpler in 
our system, we will assume the presence of a 
communication channel, which is both reliable 
and secure. Hence, the algorithm implemented 
in our system, to achieve consensus, will be the 
so-called SM (m-2) algorithm. Here, each node 
will implement the message exchange 
mechanism described by Hoffstein [10].  That 
is, in order to exchange messages: 
 
(1) The commander signs and sends its 
message to every node Ni it can reach 
directly. 
 
(2) For each node Ni:  
 
 
(a) Node, Ni, maintains a running list of 
all the messages it has received; 
(b) Node, Ni then, signs 
(authenticates) all the messages 
that node it has received, and then 
sends a copy with its signature to 
all other nodes that: 
 
i.  are directly connected (one hop 
away) to node Ni., and 
 
ii. Whose messages he has yet to 
received. 
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(c) The node will repeat step (b) until 
node Ni does not received any 
additional signed messages.  
 
(3) Ni then will arrive at a decision on the 
course of action based on all the signed 
messages at hand. 
 
It is also well noting that a compromised node 
will not necessarily follow the above Signed 
Message Algorithm. For that matter, a set of 
compromised nodes may collude with each 
other in an attempt to mislead or compromise 
all other sane nodes.  Collusion may take any 
of the following forms: 
 
(1) Falsify signatures, i.e., use each others 
signatures as part of the authentication 
process; 
(2) Forge messages; and 
(3) Send incorrect values or not send any 
values at all. 
 
 
However, as long as at least (m-2) trusted 
nodes could exchange messages to arrive at 
consensus, the Byzantine Agreement Protocol 
(BAP) holds. This is true if and only if we can 
guarantee the following:  
 
      A1. Every message that is sent is delivered 
correctly. 
      A2. The receiver of a message knows who 
sent it. 
      A3. (a) A sane nodes signature cannot be 
forged, and any alteration of the contents of his 
signed messages can be detected. 
            (b) Anyone can verify the authenticity of 
a generals signature. 
      A4. The absence of a message can be 
detected. 
 
2.0 Building a Trusted System - Overview 
 
By Trusted System, we mean a system 
composed of a set of autonomous agents that 
include at least a TTM and a SHM (Secure 
Host Manager) per node. A Secure Host 
Manager (SHM) is an autonomous agent 
residing in each node in the system that 
performs the following set of functions: 
 
! Low level (or host based) intrusion 
detection using a set of traditional 
misuse or anomalous detection 
models; 
! Provides intrusion packets to the Trust 
Manager for consensus forming; 
! Incorporates learning algorithms for the 
low level intrusion detection functions; 
and 
! It is responsible for node isolation, 
countermeasure issuance, and 
recovery. 
 
The relationship between the TTM and SHM is 
shown here in Figure 3. In this system EGOs 
are low-level Intrusion detectors (also known as 
probes) which can be turned on/off to collect 
information and minimize low level processing  
A complete discussion of the EGOs  roles and 
functions is not needed at this time. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  SAFE Architecture 
 
For the purpose of this discussion, consider a 
system S, in which all nodes are sane and 
trusted a time t0.   At some pre-specified later 
time, to + ∆,  every Trust Manager in the 
system exchanges a set of signed messages, 
following the above protocol to determine if the 
nodes in the system are still to be trusted.  After 
receiving all the messages broadcasted in the 
system, a consensus must be reached to 
determine if the system and its nodes are still 
trustworthy. Here, we assume that every node 
is either sane, which means the node is 
believable, or insane, that is a node has been 
compromised. As pointed out earlier, SAFE 
uses a Signed Message algorithm, which can 
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detect at most t insane nodes among m ones in 
the network. Once, a node or set of nodes are 
deemed to be compromised, then, the Trust 
Matrix of every sane node is updated, setting 
Tij = 0, for all compromised nodes, and 
effectively isolates them.  Finally, using a one-
way channel, the System Trust Manager will 
force the Trust Manager in each compromised 
nodes to a root state.  While in its root state, 
the TTM will no accept any further messages, 
and will issue commands to SHM in order to 
initiate countermeasures.  A compromised 
node will be allowed to join the trusted set of 
nodes again, if and only if, a known secure 
state is reached by the local TTM and SHM.  
 
2.0 Building Trusted System – Detailed 
Discussion 
 
In order to simplify our discussion, we will 
assume that: (1) during the period of time while 
the system is attempting to arrive at a 
consensus, a sane node cannot be 
compromised3, and (2) the number of nodes in 
the system does not change. In addition, any 
non-trusted nodes that want to join a network 
community (or trusted system), will use a 
Quorum Algorithm that we define as follows.:  
 
Consider the following case. There is at least 
one node that does not belong to a trusted 
system.  Such node upon boot,  
 
!  Will verify the absence of a trusted 
system by broadcasting on all links a 
join trusted system message”.  If a 
trusted system already exists, then a 
consensus process is initiated amongst 
all nodes in the trusted system.   
 
! Otherwise, the node assumes that a 
trusted system is not present; it will 
declare itself the commanding general, 
it will build a community of one, and 
then will wait for other nodes to join in.  
  
As described earlier, each node Ni maintains a 
one-dimensional Trust Matrix locally in the form 
of [ti1, ti2tin], where tij is a measurement of 
the degree to which the node Ni can believe 
that another node Nj is sane. A higher value for 
                                                 
3 This constraint can be relaxed, and SAFE is 
still capable of achieving consensus.  We will 
explore such algorithms as part of our ongoing 
research. 
tij indicates Ni has greater confidence that Nj is 
sane. A value of 0 means Ni believes firmly that 
Nj is insane. For simplicity, we set tij to be either 
0 or1, thats, tij is Boolean. The system can, 
then, be represented by an n X n Trust Matrix 
that represents the entire system trust 
relationship. 
 
We also set a Tolerant Parameter t, which is 
the maximum number of compromised nodes a 
secure system can tolerate. If more than t 
nodes in the system are compromised, the 
system cannot be trusted any longer because 
its nodes have lost their capability to detect 
intrusion. Our system uses Signed Message 
Algorithm and hence t = n-2. If the number of 
compromised nodes exceeds t, then the whole 
network will be compromised. In this case,  
  
(1) TTM at each node will issue a 
command to SHM in such a way that 
the node is taken offline, and it 
disconnect itself from the whole 
network. 
(2) TTM will set all the elements in the 
local Trust Matrix as zero, namely, tij = 
0 for each node j, which means any 
connection from this node to others 
cannot be trusted. 
(3) SHM will then repair the compromised 
node locally. 
(4) After step (3) has been accomplished 
successfully, SHM will communicate 
with TTM and request that the Quorum 
Algorithm is run to either join the 
existing community or create a new 
one. 
(5) Based on the trust relationship, TTM 
will assign new values to tij. 
             
After a node broadcasts a certain message to 
other nodes, in order for consensus to yield a 
trusted system, the following two conditions 
must be satisfied: 
 
1. All sane nodes must use the same 
message as input, so they can get the 
same output or we say they can reach 
consensus. 
2. If the node that sends the message is 
sane, then all sane nodes use the 
message it provides as input, so they 
produce the correct output. 
 
These are just our interactive consistency 
conditions IC1 and IC2, where the 
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commander is the node sending the 
message, the lieutenants are the nodes 
receiving the message. 
 
In order for our system to work properly, a 
Signed Message SM (m) algorithm must be 
implemented. Implementing such a system 
requires adherence to the following set of 
assumptions, A1 through A4.  
      A1. Every message that is sent is delivered 
correctly. 
      A2. The receiver of a message knows who 
sent it. 
      A3. (a) A sane nodes signature cannot be 
forged, and any alteration of the contents of his 
signed messages can be detected. 
            (b) Anyone can verify the authenticity of 
a generals signature. 
      A4. The absence of a message can be 
detected. 
 
Assumption A2 states that a node can 
determine the identity of the owner for any 
message that it receives. What is actually 
required is that an insane node should not be 
able to impersonate a sane one. Note that, 
under our set of conditions, A2 is encompassed 
by A3, and therefore not needed.  
  
We now consider the assumption A1, A3 and 
A4 in order, and show they are guaranteed in 
SAFE. 
 
A1. Here we assume the existence of a secure, 
fast physical communication channel. This is a 
well know research problem, see [10], [11], 
[12]. However, in a real system, the channel 
may fail. But in this case, a failed 
communication channel, from our perspective, 
just has the same effect as simply isolating it 
from the network and the countermeasure is 
building a correct, trusted network connection 
again. A3 and A4 still hold. 
 
 
A3. Property A3 (a) can not be guaranteed with 
100% certainty since any message is just a 
binary data item, and theoretically an insane 
node could generate any data item, as it likes. 
However, we can reduce the probability of this 
occurrence to any comfort level that we so 
desire. Using classical public key cryptography 
solutions can insure assumption A3. That is,  
 
(1) The sending node Ni will  
(a) Bind the message, starting time 
and its name together and encrypt 
this message block Bi by its private 
key.  
(b) Bind Bi with Nis name, a random 
data chunk Di, and a Time-stamp Ti 
into a new block by Njs public key. 
(Ti will be used for synchronization 
in the last assumption.)  
(c) Send the final message, which is 
actually the tuple {Bi:Ni:Di:Ti,} to the 
target node Nj. 
(2) Only Nj is able to decrypt the message 
block with its own private key. Then, after 
knowing whom the originator of the 
message is,  Nj will decrypt the message Bi 
by Nis public key, read the content and 
verify the authenticity of Ni. 
 
(3) If Nj is the destination, this branch of 
sending message will stop; Otherwise, it 
will: 
(a) Bind Bi and its name together 
and encrypt this message block 
Bj by its private key. 
(b) Bind Bj with Nis name, Njs 
name, and a random data chunk 
Dj, and a Time-stamp Tj, into a 
new block by Nks public key.  
(c) Send the final message block, 
which is actually {Bj:Ni:Nj:Dj:Tj,} to 
the target node Nk. 
(d) Nk will repeat (2) and (3) until 
stop. The only difference is that a 
multi-layer 
encryptions/decryptions will be 
needed, which are very 
expensive. 
   
Any decryption failure in step (2) and (3) will 
force the receiving node to assume that the 
sender of the message is insane. On the other 
hand, if an insane node fails to sign and 
encrypt its identity, then, the lack of a signed 
message will be used to declare such node 
insane at final decision consensus-making 
time. At that time, each sane node will look 
thoroughly at all the available signatures. We 
will discuss this latter case, and provide a 
solution by the creation of a time bound in 
Assumption 4. 
 
We also iterate here that there are two copies 
of the nodes names in the message block. The 
copy placed at outer layer is used to tell the 
receiving node which public key it should 
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choose for decryption and the inner copy, 
together with private keys, virtually forms a 
digital signature. 
The random data chunk D used in (1) and (3) is 
also critical, since the message B is predictable 
to some extent. For example in step (2), 
suppose that an insane node Nt, after having 
received a message Bi from node Ni, attempts 
to forge it, and sends it out as  {Bj:Ni:Nj:Dj:Tt}, in 
effect a forged copy. The receiving node cannot 
decide that the time-stamp Tt is forged and will 
use it to synchronize the whole distributed 
system as explained in Assumption 4, which 
will be disastrous. But with this random data 
item, it will be extremely difficult for the insane 
node to do so undetectably. We can even 
rearrange the order of {Bj:Ni:Nj:Dj:Tj} to further 
reduce the probability of such an event, as long 
as the receiving node can understand it. 
 
Note, that despite the fact that current 
cryptosystem cannot insure 100% secrecy, we 
can reduce the probability for an insane node to 
succeed in impersonating sane nodes to such a 
small probability that we can in effect ignore 
this problem.  In the paragraphs that follow, we 
present one such solution, and describe its 
error characteristics. 
 
Selecting a cryptosystem should be based on 
at least the following two factors: 
 
1) High speed for both encryption and 
decryption. This is of great importance 
especially when considering the fact that:  
 
a) The execution of Byzantine Agreement 
Protocol can introduce a substantial 
overhead due to the number of 
messages required to arrive at 
consensus; 
 
b) The system requires multi-layer 
cryptography.  
 
2) Security. This includes both a correct 
decryption process to insure an extremely 
low probability of successful malicious 
decryption. 
 
Our approach is to adopt NTRU, a ring-based 
public key cryptosystem that features 
reasonably short, easily created keys, high 
speed, and low memory requirements. [10, 12] 
The novelty of NTRU lies in the use of the 
mixture of polynomial algebra and reduction 
modulo two numbers p and q where gcd(p, q) = 
1 and q is significantly larger than p. So, both 
the public key and the private key are 
polynomials or vectors.  
 
The biggest advantage that NTRU over other 
PKCS is its considerably fast speed in both 
encryption and decryption with a much shorter 
key length. In [10, 12], the most time-
consuming elements of an NTRU 
implementation are the computations of 
polynomials in the vector ring modulo p and q, 
which can be reduced to O(qNlog(N)), by using 
Fast Fourier Transforms.  
 
Based on analysis in [4, 6], NTRU signature 
scheme has about the same security level as 
RSA and other signature schemes. Moreover, 
extensive experiments show the decryption 
failure of NTRU can be controlled to a low 
probability less than 5*10-5. So, the receiving 
nodes can decrypt the message correctly and 
authenticate the sender. 
 
A4. This assumption requires that the absence 
of a message can be detected and the 
receiving nodes wont be left waiting infinitely. 
The absence of a message can only be 
detected by its failure to arrive at the 
destination within some fixed length of time. 
Before we start our system, we can manually 
specify this maximum time to be ∆Tmax, 
according to the network speed for sending 
message, the diameter [7] of the system and 
the time used for generating a message. Since 
for distributed systems, no two nodes can run 
at exactly the same rate [7, 13] and the nodes 
lack a common notion of global time, we must 
use an algorithm to synchronize the clocks in 
such a distributed system.  
 
Leslie Lamport implemented logical clocks 
based on a mathematically rigorous happen 
before relation in [7]. The Physical Clocks 
model he proposed in [13] can solve the 
synchronization problem for our system. This 
model has three assumptions: 
 
(1) Every clock Ci in the distributed system 
must run continuously, rather than in 
discrete ticks, at approximately the 
speed of 1. Thats,  
 
ki ∃∀ , , so that k
dt
tdCi
<−1)(   
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where k<<1. 
 
    (2) ε∃ , a sufficiently small constant, so that 
 
ε<− )()( tCjtCi  for all i,  j. 
 
    (3) The clocks satisfy the ordinary Clock 
Condition in [7]. 
 
We also need to set a parameter ∆Tmin, which 
denote the minimum delay for a message to go 
from one node to the next node. Theoretically,  
 
        ∆Tmin =  
light of speed the
 nodes obetween tw distance physicalshortest  the
 
However, the actual value of this parameter 
should be much larger and we can assign a 
proper value to it. Then, when a node Ni 
receives a message with time-stamp Tm, it 
updates its clock by the formula:  
 
          Ci(t) = max(Ci(t), Tm+ ∆Tmin) where Ci(t) 
 
denotes the reading of the clock Ci at physical 
time t at Ni.  
 
A theorem in [13] can help us calculate how 
much time the clocks will take to be 
approximately synchronized after the system is 
first started. After that, we can run our 
Byzantine Agreement Protocol (BAP). If the 
receiver has not received the message by the 
time ti + ∆Tmax where ti is the starting time for ith 
execution of BGA, it concludes that the 
message isnt sent at all. Any message that 
arrives at a time later than ti + ∆Tmax will be 
viewed as unsent and thus ignored by the 
BAP protocol. Hence, a node that does not 
send a message within the time constraint is 
considered insane. Messages received before 
this maximum time will be used to reach 
consensus. After consensus is reached, then, 
all nodes whose messages have not been 
received will be declared insane.  The 
countermeasure and repair process will be 
initiated as described in Section 2.0.  
 
 
 
3.0 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this manuscript, solutions to the Byzantine 
Generals Problem, and associated Agreement 
Protocols to achieve consensus, have been 
applied to the problem of designing a trusted 
system.  The Agreement protocols described 
are encompassed as part of the functionality of 
an autonomous and distributed agent called 
The Trust Manager or TTM.  The TTM is 
responsible, among other things, for identifying 
and isolating compromised nodes in the 
system.   
 
The work, although theoretical in nature, is 
being use today in the design of an Intrusion 
Detection and Countermeasure System called 
SAFE currently under development at the WPI 
System Security Research Laboratory, 
WSSRL. The current work needs to be 
extended in several areas.  These are: 
 
 
 
 
1. Performance evaluation of the 
algorithms and the TTM under real-
time intrusion workloads; 
  
2. Extension of the TTM concepts to 
other areas in the system, such as 
lower level intrusion detectors; and 
 
3. Comparison of the current 
approach to other similar systems 
that depend on autonomous or 
mobile agents for their operation. 
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